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Seattle PD Special Report on the M26 Advanced TASER (Pt. 1)
Seattle PD Special Report on The M26 TASER - Part 1
For a PDF version of the report, visit: http://www.cityofseattle.net/police/Publications/Special/M26Taser.PDF
Seattle Police Department (SPD)
Special Report on Taser Implementation Year 1
The Seattle Police Department (SPD), has issued a
report on their implementation and use of the M26
Taser.
The SPD report shows that the M25 Taser is an
effective tool for use in temporarily disabling or
stopping a suspect/attacker.
It has the obvious benefit over a firearm, of being
effective, but less than lethal.
Also, if it was taken away from the user, the chance
that it then could be used, to seriously injure or
kill, would be greatly diminished.
In a home use situation, the chance of a child
accessing the device or one similar to it, and then
seriously injuring or killing another with it, would
be greatly dimished.
The device is battery operated. That and other
considerations/concerns having to do with its
practicality are addressed in the report.
This is a text version of the report that as of
5/15/03, is available on the web as a PDF file at
http://www.cityofseattle.net/police/Publications/
Special/M26Taser.PDF
Only minor formating changes, such as displaying
footnotes as (1), (2), (3), have been made to the
body of the report.
My simple, low cost, low tech, practical and
effective aiming aid, (the P&S Index Finger Rest),
would be an excellent addition/enhancement to the
M26 Taser or similar device. Info on it is on
my site - www.pointshooting.com.
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SPD SPECIAL REPORT - May 2002
The M26 Taser
Year One Implementation
In May 2000, the Mayor and City Council asked the
Seattle Police Department to consider expanding the
availability of less lethal options for patrol
officers. The Department established an internal
study group, the Force Options Research Group (FORG),
to examine less lethal alternatives and make
recommendations of options that might be adopted.
The FORG provided technical, training, and policy
expertise. A Community Workgroup, convened at the
same time, provided the viewpoint of citizens and
other stakeholders as they examined less lethal
weapons options and made recommendations concerning
them.
Both the FORG and the Community Workgroup completed
their studies in September 2000, forwarding
strikingly similar recommendations to the Mayor and
City Council. The proposals of both groups
emphasized training, particularly training in dealing
with mentally ill persons and those in other types of
crises, as well as acquisition of new less lethal
devices. The two less lethal devices that were
recommended were the M26 Taser and the less lethal
shotgun with drag stabilized beanbag rounds.
The Department's report identified the numbers of
less lethal devices and the amount and type of
training that would be required to ensure that some
less lethal option could be available across the City,
across all patrol watches, on a 24x7 basis. It was
estimated that this goal could be reached over a two-
year implementation period that would include
acquisition, testing, and training on new less lethal
devices and expansion of crisis intervention skills
training for patrol officers. The Mayor and City
Council both supported a special funding allocation
for the Department's Less Lethal Options Program in
the 2001-2002 biennial budget. Seeking to expedite
implementation of the Program, the City Council
provided some of this funding in late 2000 in the
form of an emergency appropriation.
This report focuses on the Department's progress in
implementing that portion of the Less Lethal Options
Program pertaining to the M26 Taser. It begins with
a description of the device and its role in the
broader use of force spectrum. Next, the report
describes the Department's approach to acquiring,
testing, training, and deploying the M26 Taser. Also
included is a discussion of the Department's field
experience with the device in the first year of
implementation. The Report concludes with some
reflections on lessons learned in the first year of
the taser portion of the Department's Less Lethal
Options Program.
Summary of Key Findings in the Report
- By the end of 2001, the Department had met and
exceeded its biennial goal of deploying 130 M-26
Tasers among Patrol officers, with 136 deployed.
- Distribution of tasers is roughly even across all
four precincts. In nearly 60% of the 106 incidents,
the taser officer was among the first responding
officers to the scene.
- Tasers were used in a wide variety of incidents.
Calls involving mentally ill/suicidal subjects and
traffic-related incidents are the types of situations
in which tasers were most often used.
- Sixty-three taser subjects (nearly 60%) were
impaired, often severely, by alcohol, drugs, or a
mental illness or delusion.
- A quarter of the taser subjects were armed, most
often with knives. Sixteen of twenty-six (62%) of
the armed subjects were also impaired, usually by
mental illness.
- Taser subjects were most often males (94%), between
the ages of 21-40 (67%). About half the subjects were
Caucasian and another 42% were African American.
- Tasers were used in the dart projectile mode about
60% of the time; in the stun mode, 27% of the time;
and both modes were used 12% of the time.
- Verified taser contact was obtained in 86% of the
incidents. Where there was verified contact, the
taser delivered a disabling or partially disabling
effect 95% of the time.
- In 85% of all of the incidents and in 92% of the
incidents where contact was verified, the taser was
credited with controlling the subject or bringing the
situation to a resolution.
- Both officers and subjects reported low rates of
injury during taser incidents when compared with
other use of force situations. No injuries were
directly attributable to the taser device.
The M26 Taser - What is it and what's it for?
Taser characteristics - Tasers have been in use for
over 20 years by law enforcement agencies. However,
earlier versions of the device were widely seen as
unreliable and not very accurate. In addition, the
optimal distance for use was short, about 6 feet. The
M26 Taser is a patented device manufactured by Taser
International of Scottsdale, AZ. Looking much like an
officer's service weapon, the M26 Taser is
laser-sited and uses cartridges attached to the end
of the barrel. The cartridges project a pair of
prongs or darts on copper wires over distances from
roughly 6 to 21 feet. The device sends 26 watts of
electricity at over 50,000 volts over the copper
wires, with the effect of overriding a target's motor
and sensory systems. Without the cartridge, the M26
Taser can function as a contact stun device. In
either mode, the M26 delivers its electrical charge
in a five-second cycle (which can be repeated), but
once the cycle ends or is broken, the effects
immediately disappear. Despite the use of an
electrical charge, the M26 Taser has not been found
to be harmful to persons with pacemakers or having
other unusual health conditions.
The FORG report recommended acquisition of the M26
Taser for a variety of reasons. First, with the look
and feel so much like a service weapon, the M26
appeared to be a device that would be easy for
officers to learn to use proficiently. Second, the
M26 provided a safer deployment range for officers
(6 to 21 feet) than had been true with earlier tasers,
where the range was 6 to 9 feet. This offered the
potential for disabling a subject at a standoff range
that would provide better safety and protection for
officers. Third, the M26 promised the possibility of
gaining compliance without resulting injury or
lasting effects to the subject or officers. The
ability to subdue non-compliant subjects with no
harmful effects or risk of permanent injury was an
especially attractive feature of the device. Finally,
the M26 was a moderately-priced less lethal option
that had some useful administrative review features.
Taser purpose and use - The M26 taser is intended to
provide officers with a force option to help in
overcoming a subject's combative intent, physical
resistance, and/or assaultive behavior; in disabling
or subduing persons bent on harming themselves or
others; or in providing self-defense. As with all
applications of force, officers using less lethal
options are expected to use necessary and reasonable
force to effect a lawful purpose. "Necessary and
reasonable" uses are defined by the totality of the
circumstances that confront officers.
In no situation is an officer required to use less
force than is being threatened by a subject. Moreover,
officers are cautioned against the use of a less
lethal option, such as a taser, when confronting
lethal threats, except when an armed and ready
officer is available and in place to provide
protection for officers employing these tools, as
well as for innocent parties.
In its training materials, the Department provides an
assessment of less lethal options from a use of force
perspective. The M26 Taser, when used as a touch
stun device, is viewed as a lesser use of force than
OC spray and on a par with pain compliance techniques
such as wrist locks and control holds. When used with
the dart projectiles, the M26 is viewed as a greater
use of force than pain compliance techniques, but a
lesser one than punches, kicks, or the use of other
impact weapons. Locating less lethal options on a use
of force continuum lets officers know how these
devices compare with other uses of force with which
they are more familiar. Since such assessments cannot
take into account the circumstances faced by officers
that may warrant greater or lesser force responses,
they remain guidelines and do not substitute for the
professional judgment of officers in individual cases.
(Attached is the use of force continuum used as a
training tool by the Seattle Police Department.)
Several caveats concerning the use of less lethal
options were made explicit in the FORG report. These
apply particularly to the M26 taser. First, the
report noted that the Department was planning a
limited deployment of less lethal devices. The
planned deployment provided for one taser officer per
sector squad per watch, or about 20% of overall
patrol strength. The practical effect of such a
deployment is that there would remain many instances
where less lethal options are not available to
officers called to respond to specific incidents. As
a second caveat, the FORG report indicated that the
availability of less lethal options would not
necessarily guarantee their use. Rather it was noted
that situational dynamics, in particular the timing
and volatility of an incident, dictate the response
of officers. High-risk, rapidly evolving situations,
for example, do not lend themselves to application of
a broad range of options, even if some of these
options happen to be available. Other factors, such
as the amount of time an officer has to react to the
threat, the officer's relative proximity to the
person posing the threat, the ability to isolate or
contain the person posing the threat, can also affect
the decision to deploy a less lethal option. And as
noted earlier, the capacity to use less lethal
options safely is dependent upon the availability of
lethal force as protection and backup for the
officers involved.
A final caveat identified in the FORG report was that
less lethal options should be clearly understood as
supplements to - and not substitutes for - deadly
force. In this regard, less lethal options do not
constitute "first steps" in some progression of
responses, nor are officers required to exhaust all
less lethal options before resorting to deadly force.
Based on the circumstances confronting them, officers
may still respond with the lethal options available
to them if the situation warrants a deadly force
response.
The M26 Taser - Getting Started
Initial Implementation Steps- In order to ensure
follow-through on the Department's Less Lethal
Options Program, the FORG was charged with program
implementation and ongoing study and review, under
the auspices of the Deputy Chief of Operations. The
emergency appropriation provided by the City Council
permitted acquisition of the first installment of 66
M26 Tasers in late 2000. In the last few months of
the year, the Department took steps to expedite
certification of M-26 taser instructors and
development of a training curriculum for the device.
SWAT officers visited and consulted with other
jurisdictions on their less lethal options training
classes and on the operational considerations and
guidelines employed in their less lethal programs.
Based on the information gathered, a
train-the-trainer program for M26 Taser instructors
was drafted as was the lesson plan for the four-hour
training course for taser officers. Both were
reviewed and approved by the Training Section and
Command Staff.
A Provisional Order was issued incorporating the M26
Taser into the Department's use of force policy (1)
and an interim protocol was established for receipt
and check-out of tasers and taser cartridges. In
addition, the Department worked with the Seattle Fire
Department to let them know that the taser would be
deployed and that officers would be calling EMTs to
the scene of deployments to check the condition of
subjects and to remove taser darts. The city's
largest trauma center, Harborview Medical Center, was
also contacted to make their personnel aware of the
Department's use of tasers, in case some subjects
were transported there. These were among a number of
recommendations received from other jurisdictions
that had previously deployed the taser.
As the first tasers began to be used in the field,
FORG members and taser instructors spoke with the
officers involved and reviewed each incident to guide
future training efforts. During this same period, the
FORG developed draft guidelines for receipt and
handling of tasers and taser supplies, the selection,
training, and supervision of taser officers, and the
documentation of taser deployments (2). Once this
draft was completed and under Department review, the
second installment of 64 tasers was ordered (April
2001).
The FORG reviewed the distribution of taser officers
across precincts and watches in order to identify
where there were gaps in coverage. The Group also
continued to review the lessons being learned in the
field by taser users. These were incorporated into
the lesson plan for the taser training and
certification course. Feedback from the field
suggested that officer interest in the taser had
only increased since the program was initiated. By
August 2001, the Department issued a second Directive
asking officers to express their interest in
receiving less lethal options training and deployment,
and identifying areas where additional coverage was
needed. The result of this effort was a roster of
more than 100 officers seeking less lethal training.
In light of this level of interest and after a review
of the Less Lethal Options Program budget, the
Department decided to acquire a third installment of
64 tasers. These were ordered in September 2001.
Taser Officer Training - As the training course was
being developed in the latter part of 2000, the
Department began to solicit trainees. Patrol officers
interested in being trained and assigned a taser were
directed to notify their precinct commanders by
December 1st. The names of these officers were then
forwarded to Bureau commanders who made
recommendations to the Deputy Chief of Operations
charged with oversight of the Less Lethal Options
Program. Despite the fact that the M26 was a new
device, untested by SPD, more than 100 officers
expressed interest in training and deploying it.
By late December 2000, the first training classes
were held, resulting in the first group of patrol
officers being deployed with the taser before the end
of the calendar year. After another series of taser
training classes was held in January 2001, sixty-six
officers had been trained on the taser, with 51 of
the devices deployed by patrol officers. Some of the
initial trainees who were not assigned individual
tasers were Advanced Training and Range officers, who
were expected to take over the training program at
some point. SWAT officers were not individually
assigned tasers either. Instead, tasers are located
in each SWAT vehicle for use by all unit officers
certified to use them.
As noted above, once the tasers began to be used in
the field, officers were debriefed by taser
instructors to identify needed adjustments to the
training program. One issue that surfaced early was
the need to educate other officers about the device,
how it works, and how a taser officer could best be
used in various situations. By March 2001, the
Advanced Training Section had developed a lesson plan
and incorporated a segment on taser tactics into the
Officer Street Skills class for all officers and
sergeants. The Section also developed a two-hour
supervisors' class focused on less lethal options.
The course for taser officers was also revised to
include more tactics training. The four-hour taser
training course that has emerged combines classroom
instruction (including a written test), drills and
qualifications, and scenario-based training.
A second round of taser training and certification
classes was scheduled in November 2001. When these
classes were completed, the Department had not only
met, but had exceeded, its goal of training and
deploying 130 tasers in the ranks of first-response
patrol officers.
Taser distribution - The Department has been very
deliberate in its deployment of the M26 taser.
Implementation has progressed in stages to ensure
that training efforts would be refreshed by field
experience and that the Department would continue to
build on its base of knowledge and expertise. The
Department's Less Lethal Options Program was designed
to put at least one less lethal option in the hands
of about 50% of patrol officers through a combination
of expanded CIT certification, taser deployment, and
less lethal shotgun deployment. From the beginning,
then, the priority for taser distribution was to
provide officers involved in first level response
with this less lethal alternative. However, as
confidence in and experience with the taser grew,
others in the Department began to express interest in
deploying with the device. Part of the decision to
acquire a third installment of the tasers was to
explore and support its deployment among such units.
The initial installment of 66 tasers was issued to
officers who went through the first set of training
courses. Fifty-one of the devices were distributed to
officers working the street, eight were assigned to
SWAT vehicles, five were used as trades or swap-outs
because of malfunction or damage in training or
initial use, and two were retained in Evidence for
future trades in the event of any field problems. By
the time of the second round of training classes, the
Department had received the second and third taser
installments. It had also received requests for
training and certification from a number of specialty
unit personnel and had developed guidelines to cover
taser deployment by these units.
After the second round of taser training classes, the
Department had issued a total of 158 tasers. Of these,
136 are deployed in patrol units, 14 in specialty
units (including gangs, DUI, K-9, CIT), and 8 in SWAT
vehicles. Another 20-25 officers have been trained
and certified on the taser but have not been issued a
device. These include training instructors and
supervisory personnel. Among the four precincts,
tasers are distributed as follows:
- West - 45 tasers, including four in the ACT team
- North - 35 tasers, including four in the ACT team
- South - 31 tasers, including two in the ACT team
- East - 25 tasers, including two in the ACT team
After retaining a few tasers in Evidence for trades
or swap-outs, the Department now has about thirty
more to distribute. Once again, the FORG is looking
at coverage gaps in patrol units and evaluating the
experience of speciality units in making
recommendations for further taser deployments.
Operational Issues - In this first year of
implementation, the Department has found that several
operational issues are significant in ensuring the
performance and reliability of the M-26 Taser. First,
non-taser officers must understand how the taser
operates. Officers need to know that a taser "hit"
only lasts for a five second cycle unless reapplied.
Also, it is possible for the taser effect to transfer
to someone touching the subject, including a police
officer. For this reason, taser officers need
continually to make their peers aware when they plan
to deploy the device so that other officers can avoid
being affected by it.
A second issue pertains to the taser's power source,
the batteries that are crucial to its performance.
These must be checked regularly to ensure that the
device will deliver a full charge when applied. It is
recommended that officers "spark" their tasers at the
beginning of each shift to determine if the battery is
working and at full strength. Battery use was much
higher in the first year than anticipated. In the
second year, the Department will be shifting to a
rechargeable battery that is more expensive initially,
but is less expensive in the long run. It is also
more reliable and operates at a higher level of
effectiveness in the field.
A final operational issue concerns the officer's
ability to make "real time" assessment of the taser's
effects and respond accordingly. Proficiency in
making such assessments comes with time and
experience in using the device and as officers have
used the taser more, they have gained considerable
expertise. Field experience has taught that in
general (there are exceptions) to obtain the full
effect of the device, both darts must hit the subject,
the copper wires cannot be damaged or dislodged, and
heavy clothes, if not completely penetrated, must be
near the subject's body. When these conditions are
not met, the expected results may not be obtained.
This means that taser officers may need to reapply
the device either with a new cartridge or in the stun
mode. Field conditions may not always make
reapplication possible, but as the year progressed,
officers demonstrated the confidence and capacity to
reassess the situations they were confronting and
redeploy their tasers as necessary.
Click here for the second part of the SPD report.
Formatting courtesy of www.pointshooting.com
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