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LEO Near Miss: Officer rescue mishaps during shooting incident

Radio traffic of responding units contributes to confusion and delay after an OIS during which two police officers are shot

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Officer rescue situations need to be discussed and practiced on a routine basis. Utilize radio traffic from these incidents, if available, to aid in training.

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Law Enforcement Officer (LEO) Near Miss is a voluntary, non-disciplinary officer safety initiative that allows law enforcement personnel to read about and anonymously share stories of close calls or “near misses,” which provide lessons learned that can protect fellow officers in similar situations.

Event summary

At approximately 1500 hours, two officers were shot during the attempted service of a protection order at a local residence.

An investigation leading up to the incident revealed a misdemeanor domestic violence incident occurred between a male and female the day prior, and the female obtained an order of protection that needed to be served. Furthermore, the male needed to be interviewed due to his role in the domestic violence incident.

Attempts by earlier shift officers at serving the order of protection met with negative results and the paperwork was turned over to a later shift patrol officer. The patrol officer enlisted the assistance of a back-up officer. Together, they traveled to the female victim’s home with the victim to see if the male was at the residence and, if so, serve the protection order and interview him.

Upon the arrival of the officers and the female victim at the home, attempts at making contact at the carport door were unsuccessful. The female homeowner unlocked the door for the officers and granted permission to enter to clear the residence. Officer(s) announced their presence at the door and waited for a response. The house was uncharacteristically dark for the time of day.

The primary officer made limited entry into the house with a flashlight (from carport through laundry room into kitchen – a confined small space), where she encountered the suspect coming toward her from a back bedroom in an ambush fashion with his hands in his pocket and 1000-yard stare. The primary officer gave commands for the suspect to show his hands.

The suspect immediately produced a .380 handgun and, in a fluid motion, pointed it and shot the officer in the arm/shoulder; he then proceeded to chase the second officer, who was in the laundry room hallway, shooting at her.

The primary officer, having been shot, returned fire at the suspect, striking the suspect with what was determined to be a fatal wound (had he not taken his own life later in the incident). The suspect fired at the second officer, striking her three times as she tactically retreated out of the home; one shot struck her gun forearm, causing her to lose her gun. The suspect also took one last shot at the primary officer as he was running out of the door.

From training instilled in every officer by our firearms unit, the primary officer had her arm raised in a power shield fashion, which is believed to have contributed to her not being shot in the head/face. The primary officer self-applied a tourniquet to her shot arm, gave phenomenal directions and updates to responding units, and stayed behind cover inside the house, ready to engage the suspect, as she believed the suspect was going to return to the home through the door he had exited.

Based on the incident and radio traffic, a department-wide OIS response ensued with preliminary information that two officers were shot, and the suspect was on the loose in the neighborhood, whereabouts unknown. Incident command was initiated as best as it could be; however, like most OIS critical incidents, the initial moments following the incident were chaotic. Backup officers were seconds away as our department’s K9 substation is located across the street, but the officer rescue was delayed because the calmness of the primary officer’s radio traffic was lost amidst the heavy radio traffic of responding units. As such, responding units drove past the house the primary officer was pinned down in, and then the first officer who arrived on scene at the house didn’t know the primary officer had been shot due to the tourniquet controlling her bleeding and her calmness during the entire incident.

Thankfully, both officers were evacuated, treated and survived. The primary officer is set to come back to work soon. The back-up officer is healing up. The suspect was ultimately found in a yard four houses away where he took his own life before succumbing to the lethal hit the primary officer achieved when she returned fire. He was located by K9 and a helicopter. It was later learned he was an ex-con from out of state who served a term of incarceration for 2nd-degree murder.

Lessons Learned from an officer-involved shooting

  • Officers serving restraining, protective, or vacate orders need to recognize the extreme danger these pose, so pre-planning the service is essential. Pre-planning includes obtaining background information on the subject, such as past violent activities and tendencies, access to firearms and mental state. Officers also need to determine if they require more than two officers to assist and if they need special equipment, such as a ballistic shield, or specialized personnel to serve the order.
  • Dispatchers, supervisors and commanders need to account for and ensure officers are rescued/evacuated as a priority. The radio traffic of responding units contributed to confusion and losing track of the primary officer’s status. Keep radio traffic to a minimum to allow involved officers to broadcast information. More listening and less talking on the radio would have prevented the delay in the rescue from occurring. Should the primary officer have been injured more severely (i.e., bleeding out), the delay in getting to her could have contributed to a LODD.
  • Officer rescue situations need to be discussed and practiced on a routine basis. Utilize radio traffic from these incidents, if available, to aid in training.
  • In most instances, officers responding to “shots fired” or “officer down” are pushing themselves beyond their normal limits. For officers struck by gunfire, providing the nature and seriousness of the injuries can sometimes help slow responding units and calm the situation.
  • All officers should keep a “pre-loaded/threaded” tourniquet on their person, not in their vehicle, to self-administer if they are seriously injured, just as the officer in this incident did. If your agency does not issue tourniquets, buy your own. The $30 you spend can save your life.

HOW TO SUBMIT YOUR NEAR MISS

Support this critical officer safety initiative by reading and sharing the near-miss stories and lessons learned that your fellow officers have shared, and consider sharing your own near-miss experiences at LEOnearmiss.org.

Established in 1970, the National Policing Institute, formerly the National Police Foundation, is an independent, non-partisan, and non-profit research organization, sometimes referred to as a think-tank, focused on pursuing excellence in policing through science and innovation. Our research and applied use of research guide us as we engage directly with policing organizations and communities to provide technical assistance, training, and research and development services to enhance safety, trust, and legitimacy. To view our work, visit us at www.policinginstitute.org.
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