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Creating a suspicious item SOP

I’ve been having an interesting discussion with a friend and reader who is rightly concerned about the conundrum of responding to a call concerning a suspicious item. “Maybe it’s a bomb; maybe it’s someone’s nasty, dirty, garbage…”

The underlying problem is in being wrong; if we decide it isn’t a bomb and it is, then we add a name or two to the wall (which reminds me, have you donated lately? nleomf.org). If we decide it IS a bomb and it isn’t, then we’ve got a lot of angry people who like to fire off emails. You know, the shop owners that couldn’t do business, the patrons that were oh so inconvenienced by rerouted traffic and closed sidewalks, supervisors eating antacids while calculating all the OT from the increased manpower (someone has to go block off all that stuff, right?). Don’t forget the hosedraggers, stretcher jockeys, light and power guys, EMA; all of the other people that need to show up at a bomb problem.

Oh, and the media – the armchair quarterbacks – who could tell two seconds into the story what you couldn’t: that it was a submarine sandwich, not a bomb. Lastly, there is the Bomb Squad. For some reason, there is a belief among Officers that Bomb Techs don’t like to be pestered. I have NO clue why or where this myth took root or propagated as it has, but it persists: ‘Don’t bother the Squad unless it’s for real.‘

The problem with that belief is that 99.7 percent of all Bomb Techs would love nothing more than to answer a bomb call. It doesn’t really matter what it turns out to be; a job is a job. Every Tech that I know gets knotted up every time they hear of someone kicking a box, or yanking a wire protruding from a bag because they had to be sure it was a bomb before they inconvenienced anyone.

So lets’ take the “Techs” off the table because they WANT to respond. (What about that other 0.3 percent? Don’t ask. There are some in any team or division, but they usually are NOT the ones who make any decisions.)

Other Caveats:
There will also be no mention of dog teams. I’ve gotten mixed and conflicting information from their community; some want to be part of the process, most do not. Either way, I don’t recommend using a dog *after* you’ve decided its’ a bomb – if you think its’ a bomb, that’s good enough for the Bomb Techs.

Please note also that I am not covering the fact that that the well-written policy and/or procedure needs to be in a standardized format, using defined language; that a policy statement and a procedure document are two different animals; that the document must be easy to understand, it must be complete, it must conform to applicable local, state, and Federal law, must not be unnecessarily restrictive, it must be continually reviewed, etc. Take a procedure writers’ course for all that jazz…

Writing procedure
A good procedure [SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) / General Order / Directive / Regulation / P&P (Policy and Procedure)] needs to be implementable, reasonable, and ethical.

Implementable – Anyone could write a procedure with a half million dollars worth of detectors, search gear, and 60 persons, but even at the largest department, would that be implementable? We need to be realistic when we author policy. It has to be able to work with what you have today, not what you are projecting will be available later.

Reasonable – I’ve occasionally read a new procedure or a procedural change and thought, “how the hell am I supposed to accomplish this?” These pearls of wisdom usually come from places where the street isn’t exactly visible from where the writer sits. Or, its’ written by someone who has read the books, and taken the classes, but has never stood in a parking lot with the rain pouring down, staring at a distant suitcase thinking, “Ok, now what?”

Ethical - Without opening a huge can of worms, lets’ just agree to not order folks to take excessive risk, accept injury as part of the job, or otherwise place an Officer where he or she must decide whether to do the right thing or the defensible thing. Getting killed or maimed is NOT a routine part of a Patrolman’s’ job. If you are of the opinion that procedures are for keeping Patrol in line, and not protecting Patrol, nothing I say is ever going to make any sense to you. Enough said.

The framework for this procedure finds its’ roots in a bomb search class I used to teach. I liked what I came up with because it could be used irrespective of department size, could even be used by non – Law Enforcement, and hit the Big Three we talked about a minute ago.

STEP ONE
The first thing we need to do is Decide. I will start this section by saying there is NO WAY to determine, 100 percent of the time, if a suspicious item is a bomb or not. Sorry. Because of this, I use a ‘totality of the circumstances’ risk management approach.

There are at least six aspects I teach others to look at. Briefly, they are:

Does it look like a bomb?
If it has the archetypical dynamite sticks, curly wires, alarm clock and black electrical tape, go ahead and skip to the next section. Seriously, if your procedure reader observes what they reasonably believe to be bomb components (items that just look like a bomb, timing devices with wires visible, bulk explosive – like materials or containers that could hold an explosive with wires or hoses coming out of it, or other items that appear to be modified for an unusual purpose, especially in combination with a power source), consider it to be a potential device and go to the next step. This also includes scenarios in which a suspect or owner says that the item in question is a bomb. This sounds simple, but you might be surprised by how often people can’t accept their own gut instincts. Put it in the procedure so that you remove uncertainty; if it looks like a bomb, make the call. Don’t ask/allow them to try to diagnose it further.

If it doesn’t look like a bomb, then where are we?
Is this a high crime area? One known for frequent protests? A facility that sparks debate like an abortion clinic or weapons plant? A place that might be regarded as the face of something / someone, like a government building, college admin complex, embassy, house of a registered sex offender? A mission critical site? Has the potential for mass casualty? Certainly this is a wide net to cast, but it is only one of several factors we are considering.

Is it reasonable to find where it is?
A backpack most certainly can be a bomb. But more often it is a container for books and dirty tube socks. So, how do we decide? Well... where is it? A backpack in a chair in the High School library generally turns out to be a much different creature than one found draped over the natural gas main cutoff behind a government building.

So, our third deciding factor becomes ‘is it reasonable where it is found?’ If it is, we don’t stop here anymore than we would if a person passed just one of the standardized field sobriety tests. If it is not, then, like the sobriety tests, that’s one point towards our belief that this item is a potential bomb.

Does anyone claim it?
Going back to our bag-on-the-gas pipe scenario, as we are standing there (hopefully away from the item), and a kid with a skateboard darts up and grabs the bag, that pretty much ends the decision tree. Take an airport, for instance. Luggage is absolutely a normal item. So is the occasional unattended bag. But if you announce on the overhead PA, there is no one around in the concourse or in the lavatories, and all of the planes have pushed back, that’s what we call a clue, so it should be verbalized in our procedure.

What is the threat level?
Sure, nationally, but even more importantly, locally. Is this an upcoming anniversary date for something important such as a birth (or death) day for a notorious person or incident? Was there a fight here yesterday – replete with the usual threats – and now there is a huge box with a bow on the front porch? Is there a history here? Are we finding these things all over town, or getting NLETS warnings that your item is being found, right now, across the country? Have your SRO’s been doing their job and listening for pre-attack indicators? How about your Correctional Officers? Is there somebody with a thirst for vengeance getting out?

These are but a few of the deciding factors we can use, but they are my favorite. Usually, if we are flunking more than two or three of these, it’s pretty safe to say that the reader of the procedure ought to call it a potential bomb and move on. Yes, there are circumstances in which a suspicious item can meet all these factors and still be a bag of dirty diapers, but we are using risk management here. We are weighing the necessity of not tying up resources and assets against the potential for death and injury, and like a crooked butcher shop, my thumb is always on the scale in favor of calling it a potential bomb.

STEP TWO
At this point, your procedure reader should have several points either ‘for’ or ‘against.’ Put very simply, the majority rules. If it isn’t a clear majority, or if there is something that tingles the “Spidey Senses,” the reader should call a supervisor and let them make a call. That’s why the “Supe” makes the Big Bucks, right? If your procedure reader got here from the first point where we decided the thing looked like a bomb, then they just need to call a supervisor, and do nothing (besides maintain a watchful distance so that they can minimize injury to themselves and still warn others away) until their arrival.

Now comes the lousy part: ordering no, partial, or a complete evacuation – maybe closing roads, cutting public works, calling in more warm bodies – but definitely impacting the work day and the society at large. This is something a “Chief,” and not an “Indian,” should do. Not because a Patrolman (or equivalent first-line responder) aren’t capable, because we know we are, but for several good reasons.

Bosses like talking to other bosses. People tend to accept things from people who are higher up in the food chain. A first-line (or above) supervisor may already have some training in how the jurisdiction wants larger incidents handled. Lastly, but most importantly, your procedure reader just washed their hands of any further liability save documenting their reasoning for making their determinations, and getting witnesses to start writing their statements.

STEP THREE
Although this step is primarily for supervisors, I recommend putting it in your procedure anyway. It aids in continuity. But writing this section will be much harder than the previous two. That’s because up until now, there weren’t many other external or internal stakeholders in this particular problem.

Now, though, there are much larger implications. NIMS – the National Incident Management System – begins to come into play. You need to query other applicable agencies and find out what they think they need to do in this kind of incident. In other words, you can’t order the gas cut-off if the Gas Company says that order can only come from the Executive Director. But, you can write into your policy that Dispatch needs to call that Director and have him contact Incident Command because he will be ordering the gas turned off shortly.

So, how much circus do we supervisors need?

This is an easier part to guesstimate. Lets’ look at a few factors:

What are the worst case prompt (immediate) effects if the device functions? This means, look at your suspicious item. Assume for this calculation that it is entirely and completely filled with high explosives. Now assume it goes bang. Obviously, a conventional explosive purse bomb is not going to be as big an issue as one in an 18’ truck. Factor in extra points if the bomb will damage something critical or release something that doesn’t need letting out.

What will be the delayed effects if the potential bomb functions? People are more skittish post-9/11. Assume no prior evacuation. Is this the heavy traffic part of the day? Are we in the congested part of town? How much of a surge is going to commence? Are evacuation routes obvious and straightforward, or are there a lot of cross streets and traffic signals? What about foot traffic? Is there a lot of glass?

How prepared are you for this? Do you have a Bomb Squad? Do you have a power shift or a Reserve unit?

Lastly, what existing framework is there? Has someone else in senior management already written some tangential procedure? Does your Mayors’ Office also already have some part of a plan? I guarantee you your friendly neighborhood emergency management agency has one (Google ‘all hazards planning’). This procedure may only directly affect 12 Patrolmen in a small county, but if it doesn’t mesh with what is already planned, guess which part of the bigger plan is not going to work well? Yes, that’s right, yours.

In reverse, you may consider offering your procedure (with your managements’ approval) to external agencies. If they know what you plan to do depending on what is going on, they can more accurately forecast what they are going to be doing. If you use confidential radio signals, or special channels, they don’t need to know that, but if your procedure involves them at a certain level, it is just good stewardship for them to get a heads up in advance. It may just be the porta-potty guy, but if you burn that bridge peremptorily, I can promise you when he only shows up with two toilets for 75 responders (if he shows at all), you’ll wish you’d listened to me.

I hope that this article will help you in your endeavors. For those of you that don’t find this enough grist for your writing mill, check out the attached boilerplate model policy. You’re welcome to use it, but be sure to credit where you found it.

You’ll notice that we didn’t discuss how to approach a potential device, or more specific details on components, etc. etc. If these things interest you, let P1 know you want more from me, and I’ll do what I can to oblige.

Special thanks go to Lt. Gary Mason in Colorado for suggesting the topic!

For more on creating procedure, see Model Policy and Procedure Manuals, National Center for Rural Law Enforcement, National Criminal Justice Institute, University of Arkansas

Shawn Hughes is a veteran Patrol Officer who in addition to being a Bomb Technician, has served with other special teams including Entry, Narcotics, and Technical Surveillance units. A sometimes controversial speaker and writer, his work has appeared in peer-reviewed journals including the National Tactical Association’sTactical Edge, the International Association of Bomb Technicians’ Detonator, and other respected national publications such as S.W.A.T., Police, Frontline Responder and The Police Marksman.

His books include a well-received manual for First Responders and Prepared Citizens entitled, The WMD Awareness Guide, and one in post-production; the first in a series of study guides on physical security vulnerability exploitation.

When he isn’t writing, he teaches, lectures and consults for government and the private sector in addition to whatever else tickles his fancy.

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