Editor’s note: Two weeks after the attacks in Mumbai, India—in which fewer than a dozen militants held at bay some 800 police for 60 hours—PoliceOne presented a special report consisting of articles from Police1 Columnists Lt. Dan Marcou and Sgt. Glenn French, as well as analysis from Stratfor and opinion from P1 members. Today we present part two in this three-part series from Police1 Columnist Dick Fairburn on the important subject of police readiness and training for a Mumbai-style attack. Be sure to check out part one here, and watch for part three in coming weeks.
In part one, I outlined the need for police agencies to establish policies and training for a response to teams of terrorist active shooters attacking their community like the attacks we recently saw in Mumbai, India. In recent years, we have taken a major step toward the necessarily cohesive, team-oriented response techniques by developing Active Shooter Response tactics.
Part Two: The Different Response
The next step in that evolution—Rapid Deployment version 2.0—must layer additional tactics for breaking a contact team into two fire and maneuver elements to either pin down and destroy enemy attackers, or at least to drive those attackers away from highly concentrated groups of victims. This isn’t rocket science, boys and girls, it’s basic infantry tactics for effectively moving platoons, rifle squads, or even two-officer buddy teams during battle. These tactics are so basic and effective, they worked well for the terrorists in Mumbai. Can we hope to deal effectively with similar attacks unless our police officers can respond in like fashion?
The Tactics
Before making contact with the enemy, the moving teams will alternate between a covering position (with cover) and a bounding movement (see “Related BluTube” videos in the sidebar of this column). Any solo officer who may have responded prior to our teams being assembled, should provide valuable on-scene Intel and serve as a Pathfinder to guide the teams more quickly to the battle.
Once contact is made, the lead element will become the “Fire” team whose goal is to keep the enemy pinned down, unable to move or return fire. Once the Fire team has engaged the enemy, the Maneuver team will advance to a new position offering a clear field of fire; as well as, whenever possible, good cover. The advance of the Maneuver team may allow them to move behind buildings, trees or terrain. In more open topography the team may need to crawl forward or, in a worst case situation, resort to a short (three- to five-second) “rush” to their new position. The teams now alternate roles, leapfrogging eventually to points where they can flank the enemy and neutralize the threat through capture or destruction. The tactic is easily explained and easily learned. Of course the ancient dictum, that no plan ever survives contact with the enemy, will make the execution more difficult under fire.
If they are available, smoke grenades can be utilized to screen the movements of the Maneuver team. Just remember, smoke merely offers concealment, not the protection of true cover.
Communications
Obviously, to use fire and maneuver tactics effectively, the teams must be able to communicate to coordinate their movements. Reliable radio communications are the best option, but we know that communications technology has a nasty tendency to fail just when we need it the most. Also, if a jurisdiction is hit with simultaneous attacks by teams of terrorists at multiple locations like we saw in Mumbai, we would need 10 discreet radio channels to cover each of the 10 scenes, which is beyond the capability of most systems.
Voice communication is always an option if the teams are within earshot, until the battle becomes too loud. Those who have experienced such combat invariably describe it as LOUD. If your agency still issues the traditional police whistle, that simple device can provide reliable communications. Hand signals must be standardized and taught to all officers for situations when all other forms of communication fail.
Leadership
For the last 10 years, I have been occupied with analyzing police response to critical incidents and teaching techniques for improving our response. The glaring commonality I’ve seen in nearly all tragic police incidents is the lack of effective leadership early in the incident. Compare the normal one-at-a-time police response to that of our brothers and sisters who ride the big red trucks. Firefighters always respond as a team. Further, you can tell the role of each player by where they sit on the truck. The Engineer drives the truck and mans the controls when they arrive. The team leader always rides in the “shotgun” position in the front seat. Police officers almost always respond singly, and in major calls the response will come from different “beats” in a large city or from multiple departments in less urban locales. So, there is rarely a clear cut leader who can take charge of the initial response. Some agencies are better organized, but they are the exception, not the rule.
Also, as a profession law enforcement does not do a good job at developing leaders. We send upwardly mobile officers to various management schools (FBI National Academy, etc.), but a true, military-style leadership school for first-line supervisors, where you get practice shouting commands and maneuvering elements, is lacking. I’ll doubtlessly get nasty E-mail from those who will put forward their “leadership program,” and I hope they prove me wrong. But, we’ve been looking long and hard and have yet to find a “boot camp” for Sergeants with a focus of hands-on leadership techniques for critical incidents. We hope to build such a school in the near future. Until then, we will continue to rely on officers who have learned their leadership skills in the military. Our nation’s war on terrorism has produced many fine small-unit leaders who have been tested in the battle zones of Afghanistan and Iraq and are now appearing in growing numbers at the front door of police academies.
Wherever these fine men and women learned how to take charge, we will need them to step up and assume command should we face teams of well armed and well trained terrorist attackers. Good leadership can assemble small teams of officers at a hastily-determined rally point, when the radio calls point to a possible terrorist attack. That leader can position officers arriving early to forward overwatch and covering positions, while delivering a one-minute refresher of fire & maneuver tactics to the remainder of the team using a stick and a handy patch of dirt. Teams will be broken up and a quick chain-of-command established for each team.
Then the teams will move out toward the sounds of gunfire, practicing their movements in bounding overwatch as they approach the Hot Zone. Taking this slower method of organizing a team and conducting a quick train-up will undoubtedly cost lives for those precious minutes when the terrorists are free to run their plan, but the time spent building a response team will pay huge dividends when contact is made. We must assume that the terrorists have trained and drilled extensively on their plan, including the anticipated police response. So, we must greet them with accurate, coordinated fire and the demoralizing effect of seeing multiple teams assaulting their position from differing directions.
Coordination
Every bit as big a problem as leadership, will be the need for the overall coordination of the response to multiple attack sites. Above the team leader level, precinct commanders or shift commanders must establish a command post, possibly several forward command posts for the various attack venues. Massive amounts of basic and specialized resources will be needed to set perimeters to isolate each attacking terrorist team from potential victims. The number of casualties will be overwhelming. Even keeping police teams adequately supplied with reinforcements and ammunition is likely to be chaotic. Quickly establishing essential elements of the Incident Command System (ICS) will allow support personnel to focus their efforts on logistics, planning and assembling the larger operational elements that will relieve our brave teams of patrol officers.
If the following sounds like bragging, remember that you’re not bragging if you can do it. Illinois is a national leader in creating a sophisticated mutual-aid system involving virtually every police agency in the state, called the Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System (ILEAS). We didn’t invent it—we stole the framework from the guys and girls in the big red trucks who previously created the nation’s most comprehensive fire mutual aid system, called the Mutual Aid Box Alarm System (MABAS).
This same organizational template is being replicated by other response disciplines in Illinois, such as the Emergency Medical response community’s IMERT and other groups like public safety dispatchers, public works crews and even morticians who will answer the call-out when a community’s response is overwhelmed. The ILEAS organization is creating regional Special Response Teams (SRT) which combine officers from many agencies within that region who have completed at least a 40 hour Basic SWAT school.
When the call went out for help after Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans, hundreds of Illinois police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel—from dozens of agencies, large and small—responded in multiple waves. We even brought our own equipment and supplies so we didn’t overtax the available resources on-site. Developing this level of organization in your state will get you the huge response of manpower and supplies necessary to confront an incident on the scale of a Mumbai attack.
In the third part of this series, I will discuss the need for overall coordination of the response to these multiple attack scenes, and the huge mutual-aid response that will be headed your way. We will also take a quick look at the weapons and other attributes that could mean the difference between success and failure.
